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Abstract—We consider a dynamic traffic routing game over an
urban road network involving a large number of drivers in which
each driver selecting a particular route is subject to a penalty
that is affine in the logarithm of the number of drivers selecting
the same route. We show that the mean-field approximation of
such a game leads to the so-called linearly solvable Markov
decision process, implying that its mean-field equilibrium (MFE)
can be found simply by solving a finite-dimensional linear system
backward in time. Based on this backward-only characterization,
it is further shown that the obtained MFE has the notable
property of strong time-consistency. A connection between the
obtained MFE and a particular class of fictitious play is also
discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The mean-field game (MFG) theory, introduced by the
authors of [2] and [3] almost concurrently, provides a powerful
framework to study stochastic dynamic games where (i) the
number of players involved in the game is large, (ii) each
individual player’s impact on the network is infinitesimal,
and (iii) players’ identities are indistinguishable. The central
idea of the MFG theory is to approximate, in an appropri-
ate sense, the original large-population game problem by a
single-player optimal control problem, in which individual
player’s best response to the mean field (average behavior
of the population) is analyzed. Typically, the solution to
the latter problem is characterized by a pair of backward
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) and forward Fokker-Planck-
Kolmogorov (FPK) equations; the HJB equation guarantees
player-by-player optimality, while the FPK equation guaran-
tees time consistency of the solution. The coupled HJB-FPK
systems, as well as alternative mathematical characterizations
(e.g., McKean-Vlasov systems), have been studied extensively
[3]–[5].
There has been a recent growth in the literature on MFGs
and its applications. MFGs under Linear Quadratic (LQ) [6]–
[8] and more general settings [9], [10] are both extensively
explored. MFGs with a major agent and a large number of
minor agents are studied [9] and applied to design decentral-
ized security defense decisions in a mobile ad hoc network
[11]. MFGs with multiple classes of players are investigated
in [12]. The authors of [13] studied the existence of robust
(minimax) equilibrium in a class of stochastic dynamic games.
In [14], the authors analyzed the equilibrium of a hybrid
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stochastic game in which the dynamics of agents are affected
by continuous disturbance as well as random switching sig-
nals. Risk-sensitive MFGs were considered in [15]. While
continuous-time continuous-state models are commonly used
in the references above, [16]–[20] have considered the MFG in
discrete-time and/or discrete-state regime. The issues of time
inconsistency in MFG and mean-field type optimal control
problems are discussed in [21]–[23].
While substantial progress has been made on the MFG
literature in recent years, there has been a long history of
mean-field-like approaches to large-population games in the
transportation research literature [24]. A well-known con-
sequence of a mean-field-like analysis of the traffic user
equilibrium is the Wardrop’s first principle [25], [26], which
provides the following characterization of the traffic condition
at an equilibrium: journey times on all the routes actually used
are equal, and less than those which would be experienced by
a single vehicle on any unused route. This result, as well as
a generalized concept known as stochastic user equilibrium
(SUE) [27], has played a major role in the transportation
research, including the convergence analysis of users’ day-
to-day routing policy adjustment process [28]–[32]. However,
currently only a limited number of results are available con-
necting the transportation research and recent progress in the
MFG theory. The work [19] considers discrete-time discrete-
state mean-field route choice games. In [10], the authors
modeled the interaction between drivers on a straight road as
a non-cooperative game and characterized its MFE. In [33],
the authors considered a continuous-time Markov chain to
model the aggregated behavior of drivers on a traffic network.
A Markovian framework for traffic assignment problems is
introduced in [34], which is similar to the problem formulation
adopted in this paper. A connection between large-population
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) and MFGs has been
discussed in a recent work [35]. MFG has been applied to
pedestrian crowd dynamics modeling in [36], [37].
In this paper, we apply the MFG theory to study the
strategic behavior of infinitesimal drivers traveling over an
urban traffic network. Specifically, we consider a discrete-time
dynamic stochastic game wherein, at each intersection, each
driver randomly selects one of the outgoing links as her next
destination according to a randomized policy. We assume that
individual drivers’ dynamics are decoupled from each other,
while their cost functions are coupled. In particular, we assume
that the cost function for each driver is congestion-dependent,
and is affine in the logarithm of the number of drivers taking
the same route. We regard the congestion-dependent term in
the cost function as an incentive mechanism (toll charge)
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2imposed by the Traffic System Operator (TSO). Although the
assumed structure of cost functionals is restrictive, the purpose
of this paper is to show that the considered class of MFGs
exhibits a linearly solvable nature, and requires somewhat
different treatments from the standard MFG formalism. We
emphasize that the computational advantages that follow from
this special property are notable both from the existing MFG
and the transportation research perspectives. Contributions of
this paper are summarized as follows:
1) Linear solvability: We prove that the MFE of the game de-
scribed above is given by the solution to a linearly solvable
MDP [38], meaning that it can be computed by performing
a sequence of matrix multiplications backward in time only
once, without any need of forward-in-time computations.
This offers a tremendous computational advantage over the
conventional characterization of the MFE where there is a
need to solve a forward-backward HJB-FPK system, which
is often a non-trivial task [4].
2) Strong time-consistency: Due to the backward-only char-
acterization, the MFE in our setting is shown to be strongly
time-consistent [39], a stronger property than what follows
from the standard forward-backward characterization of
MFEs.
3) MFE and fictitious play: With an aid of numerical simu-
lation, we show that the derived MFE can be interpreted
as a limit point of the belief path of the fictitious play
process [40] in a scenario where the traffic routing game
is repeated.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The traffic
routing game is set up in Section II and its mean field
approximation is discussed in Section III. The linearly solvable
MDPs are reviewed in Section IV, which is used to derive
the MFE of the traffic routing game in Section V. Time
consistency of the derived MFE is studied in Section VI. A
connection between MFE and fictitious play is investigated in
Section VII. Numerical studies are summarized in Section VIII
before we conclude in Section IX.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The traffic game studied in this paper is formulated as an N -
player, T -stage dynamic game. Denote by N = {1, 2, · · · , N}
the set of players (drivers) and by T = {0, 1, · · · , T − 1} the
set of time steps at which players make decisions.
A. Traffic graph
The traffic graph is a directed graph G = (V, E), where
V = {1, 2, ..., V } is the set of nodes (intersections) and E =
{1, 2, ..., E} is the set of directed edges (links). For each i ∈ V ,
denote by V(i) ⊆ V the set of intersections to which there is
a directed link from the intersection i. At any given time step
t ∈ T , each player is located at an intersection. The node
at which the n-th player is located at time step t is denoted
by in,t ∈ V . At every time step, player n at location in,t
selects her next destination jn,t ∈ V(in,t). By selecting jn,t
at time t, the player n moves to the node jn,t at time t + 1
deterministically (i.e., in,t+1 = jn,t).
B. Routing policy
At every time step t, each player selects her next destination
according to a randomized routing policy. Let ∆J be the J-
dimensional probability simplex, and Qin,t = {Qijn,t}j∈V(i) ∈
∆|V(i)|−1 be the probability distribution according to which
player n at intersection i selects the next destination j ∈ V(i).
We consider the collection Qn,t = {Qin,t}i∈V of such prob-
ability distributions as the policy of player n at time t. For
each n ∈ N and t ∈ T , notice that Qn,t ∈ Q, where
Q =
{
{Qi}i∈V : Qi ∈ ∆|V(i)|−1 ∀i ∈ V
}
is the space of admissible policies. Suppose that the initial
locations of players {in,0}n∈N are independent and identically
distributed random variables with Pn,0 = P0 ∈ ∆|V|−1. Note
that if the policy {Qn,t}t∈T of player n is fixed, then the
probability distribution Pn,t = {P in,t}i∈V of her location at
time t is computed recursively by
P jn,t+1 =
∑
i
P in,tQ
ij
n,t ∀t ∈ T , j ∈ V. (1)
If (in,t, jn,t) is the location-action pair of player n at time t,
it has the joint distribution P in,tQ
ij
n,t. We assume that location-
action pairs (in,t, jn,t) and (im,t, jm,t) for two different play-
ers m 6= n are drawn independently under individual policies
{Qn,t}t∈T and {Qm,t}t∈T . With a slight abuse of notation,
we sometimes write Qn := {Qn,t}t∈T for simplicity.
C. Cost functional
We assume that, at each time step, the cost functional for
each player has two components as specified below:
1) Travel cost: For each i ∈ V , j ∈ V(i) and t ∈ T , let
Cijt be a given constant representing the cost (e.g., fuel cost)
for every player selecting j at location i at time t.
2) Tax cost: We assume that players are also subject to
individual and time-varying tax penalties calculated by the
TSO. The tax charged to player n at time step t depends
not only on her own location-action pair at t, but also on the
behavior of the entire population at that time step. Specifically,
we consider the log-population tax mechanism, where the tax
charged to player n taking action j at location i at time t is
piijN,t,n = α
(
log
KijN,t
KiN,t
− logRijt
)
. (2)
Here, α > 0 is a fixed constant characterizing the “ag-
gressiveness” of the tax mechanism. In (2), KiN,t is the
number of players (including player n) who are located at
the intersection i at time t. Likewise, KijN,t is the number
of players (including player n) who takes the action j at
the intersection i at time t. The parameters Rijt > 0 are
fixed constants satisfying
∑
j R
ij
t = 1 for all i. We interpret
Rijt as the “reference” routing policy specified by the TSO
in advance. Notice that (2) indicates that agent n receives a
positive reward by taking action j at location i at time t if
KijN,t/K
i
N,t < R
ij
t (i.e., the realization of the traffic flow is
below the designated congestion level), while she is penalized
by doing so if KijN,t/K
i
N,t > R
ij
t . Since K
i
N,t and K
ij
N,t
3are random variables, piijN,t,n is also a random variable. We
assume that the TSO is able to observe KiN,t and K
ij
N,t at
every time step so that piijN,t,n is computable.
1 In what follows,
we assume that each player is risk neutral. That is, each player
is interested in choosing a policy that minimizes the expected
sum of travel and tax costs incurred over the planning horizon
T . For player n whose location-action pair at time step t is
(i, j), the expected tax cost incurred at that time step can be
expressed as
ΠijN,n,t , E
[
piijN,n,t | in,t = i, jn,t = j
]
. (3)
As we detail in equation (23) in Appendix A, for each location-
action pair (i, j), ΠijN,n,t can be expressed in terms of Q−n ,
{Qm}m 6=n. The fact that ΠijN,n,t does not depend on player
n’s own policy will be used to analyze the optimal control
problem (5) below.2
D. Traffic routing game
Overall, the cost functional to be minimized by the n-th
player in the considered game is given by
J (Qn, Q−n) =
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
(
Cijt + Π
ij
N,n,t
)
. (4)
Notice that this quantity depends not only on the n-th player’s
own policy Qn but also on the other players’ policies Q−n
through the term ΠijN,n,t. Equation (4) defines an N -player dy-
namic game, which we call the traffic routing game hereafter.
We introduce the following equilibrium concepts.
Definition 1: The N -tuple of strategies {Q∗n}n∈N is said
to be a Nash equilibrium if the inequality J
(
Qn, Q
∗
−n
) ≥
J
(
Q∗n, Q
∗
−n
)
holds for each n ∈ N and Qn.
Definition 2: The N -tuple of strategies {Q∗n}n∈N is said
to be symmetric if Q∗1 = Q
∗
2 = · · · = Q∗N .
Remark 1: The N -player game described above is a
symmetric game in the sense of [41]. Thus, [41, Theorem 3] is
applicable to show that it has a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Remark 2: We assume that players are able to compute a
Nash equilibrium strategy {Q∗n}n∈N prior to the execution of
the game based on the public knowledge G, α,N , T , Rijt , Cijt
and P0. Often the case, it is favorable that a Nash equilibrium
is time-consistent in that no player is given an incentive
to deviate from the precomputed equilibrium routing policy
after observing real-time data (such as KiN,t and K
ij
N,t). In
Section VI, we discuss a notable time consistency property of
an equilibrium of the traffic routing game formulated above
in the large-population limit N →∞.
III. MEAN FIELD APPROXIMATION
In the remainder of this paper, we are concerned with the
large-population limit N →∞ of the traffic routing game.
1Whenever piijN,t,n is computed, we have both K
ij
N,t ≥ 1 and KiN,t ≥ 1
since at least player n herself is counted. Hence (2) is well-defined.
2Although the value of ΠijN,n,t for each (i, j) cannot be altered by player
n’s policy, she can minimize the total cost by an appropriate route choice
(e.g., by avoiding links with high toll fees).
Definition 3: A set of strategies {Q∗n}n∈N is said to be an
MFE if the following conditions are satisfied.
(a) It is symmetric, i.e., Q∗1 = Q
∗
2 = · · · = Q∗N .
(b) There exists a sequence N satisfying N ↘ 0 as N →∞
such that for each n ∈ N = {1, 2, ..., N} and Qn, the
inequality J(Qn, Q∗−n) + N ≥ J(Q∗n, Q∗−n) holds.
Now, we derive a condition that an MFE must satisfy by
analyzing player n’s best response when all other players adopt
a homogeneous routing policy Q∗ = {Q∗t }t∈T . Since Q∗ is
adopted by all players other than n, the probability that a
specific player m(6= n) is located at i is given by P i∗t , where
P ∗ = {P ∗t }t∈T is computed recursively by
P j∗t+1 =
∑
i
P i∗t Q
ij∗
t ∀j ∈ V.
Player n’s best response is characterized by the solution to the
following optimal control problem:
min
{Qt}t∈T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P itQ
ij
t
(
Cijt + Π
ij
N,n,t
)
. (5)
Here, we note that ΠijN,n,t is fully determined by the homo-
geneous policy Q∗ adopted by all other players. (The detail is
shown in equation (24) in Appendix A.) In (5), we wrote Pt
and Qt in place of Pn,t and Qn,t to simplify the notation.
To analyze player n’s best response when N → ∞, we
compute the quantity limN→∞Π
ij
N,n,t as follows:
Lemma 1: Let ΠijN,n,t be defined by (3). If Qm,t = Q
∗
t for
all m 6= n and P i∗t Qij∗t > 0, then
lim
N→∞
ΠijN,n,t = α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
.
Proof: Appendix B.
Intuitively, Lemma 1 shows that the optimal control problem
(5) when N is large is “close to” the optimal control problem:
min
{Qt}t∈T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P itQ
ij
t
(
Cijt +α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
)
. (6)
In order for the policy Q∗ to constitute an MFE, the policy Q∗
itself needs to be the best response by player n. In particular,
Q∗ must solve the optimal control problem (6). That is, the
following fixed point condition must be satisfied:
Q∗ ∈ arg min
{Qt}t∈T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P itQ
ij
t
(
Cijt +α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
)
. (7)
In the next two sections, we show that the condition (7) is
closely related to the class of optimal control problems known
as linearly-solvable MDPs [38], [42]. Based on this observa-
tion, we show that an MFE can be computed efficiently.
IV. LINEARLY SOLVABLE MDPS
In this section, we review linearly-solvable MDPs [38], [42]
and their solution algorithms. For each t ∈ T , let Pt be the
probability distribution over V that evolves according to
P jt+1 =
∑
i
P itQ
ij
t ∀j ∈ V (8)
4with the initial state P0. We assume C
ij
t , R
ij
t for each t ∈
T , i ∈ V, j ∈ V and α are given positive constants. Consider
the T -step optimal control problem:
min
{Qt}t∈T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P itQ
ij
t
(
Cijt + α log
Qijt
Rijt
)
. (9)
The logarithmic term in (9) can be written as the Kullback–
Leibler (KL) divergence from the reference policy Rijt to the
selected policy Qijt . For this reason (9) is also known as the
KL control problem [43]. Notice the similarity and difference
between the optimal control problems (6) and (9); in (6) the
logarithmic term is a fixed constant (Q∗ is given), while in
(9) the logarithmic term depends on the chosen policy Q. To
solve (9) by backward dynamic programming, for each t ∈ T ,
introduce the value function:
Vt(Pt) , min
{Qτ}T−1τ=t
T−1∑
τ=t
∑
i,j
P iτQ
ij
τ
(
Cijτ + α log
Qijτ
Rijτ
)
and the associated Bellman equation
Vt(Pt) = min
Qt
{∑
i,j
P itQ
ij
t
(
Cijt + α log
Qijt
Rijt
)
+ Vt+1(Pt+1)
}
(10)
with the terminal condition VT (·) = 0. The next theorem states
that the Bellman equation (10) can be linearized by a change of
variables (the Cole-Hopf transformation), and thus the optimal
control problem (9) is reduced to solving a linear system [38].
Theorem 1: Let {φt}t∈T be the sequence of V -dimensional
vectors defined by the backward recursion
φit =
∑
j
Rijt exp
(
−C
ij
t
α
)
φjt+1 ∀i ∈ V (11)
with the terminal condition φiT = 1 ∀i. Then, for each t =
0, 1, · · · , T and Pt, the value function can be written as
Vt(Pt) = −α
∑
i
P it log φ
i
t. (12)
Moreover, the optimal policy for (9) is given by
Qij∗t =
φjt+1
φit
Rijt exp
(
−C
ij
t
α
)
. (13)
Proof: Appendix C.
We stress that (11) is linear in φ and can be computed by
matrix multiplications backward in time.
V. MEAN FIELD EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we investigate the relationship between the
optimal control problem (9) and the fixed point condition
(7) for an MFE in the traffic routing game. To this end, we
introduce the value function for the optimal control problem
(6), defined by
V˜t(Pt) , min
{Qτ}T−1τ=t
T−1∑
τ=t
∑
i,j
P iτQ
ij
τ
(
Cijτ +α log
Qij∗τ
Rijτ
)
The value function satisfies the Bellman equation:
V˜t(Pt) = min
Qt
{∑
i,j
P itQ
ij
t
(
Cijt + α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
)
+V˜t+1(Pt+1)
}
(14)
with the terminal condition V˜T (·) = 0. We emphasize the
distinction between V˜t(·) and Vt(·). As in the previous section,
Vt(·) is the value function associated with the KL control
problem (9), whereas V˜t(·) is the value function associated
with the optimal control problem (6). Despite this difference,
the next lemma shows an intimate connection between Vt(·)
and V˜t(·). In particular, if the parameter Q∗ in (6) is chosen
to be the solution to the KL control problem (9), then
the objective function in (6) becomes a constant that does
not depend on the decision variable {Qt}t∈T (the equalizer
property3 of the optimal KL control policy). Moreover, under
this circumstance, the value function V˜t(·) for (6) coincides
with the value function Vt(·) for the KL control problem (9).
Lemma 2: If {Q∗t }t∈T in (6) is fixed to be the solution to
the KL control problem (9), then an arbitrary policy {Qt}t∈T
with Qt ∈ Q is an optimal solution to (6). Moreover, for each
t ∈ T and Pt, we have
V˜t(Pt) = −α
∑
i
P it log φ
i
t (15)
where {φt}t∈T is the sequence calculated by (11).
Proof: We show (15) by backward induction. If t = T , the
claim trivially holds due to the definition V˜T (PT ) = 0 and the
fact that the terminal condition for (11) is given by φiT = 1.
Thus, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, assume that
V˜t+1(Pt+1) = −α
∑
j
P jt+1 log φ
j
t+1
holds. Using ρijt = C
ij
t − α log φjt+1, the Bellman equation
(14) can be written as
V˜t(Pt) = min
Qt
∑
i,j
P itQ
ij
t
(
ρijt + α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
)
. (16)
Substituting Qij∗t obtained by (13) into (16), we have
V˜t(Pt) = min
Qt
∑
i,j
P itQ
ij
t
(−α log φit) (17a)
= min
Qt
∑
i
P it
(−α log φit)∑
j
Qijt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
(17b)
= −α
∑
i
P it log φ
i
t. (17c)
This completes the proof of (15). The chain of equalities (17)
also shows that the decision variable Qt vanishes in the “min”
operator, indicating that any Qt ∈ Q is a minimizer. This
shows the equalizer property of {Q∗t }t∈T .
Lemma 2 provides the following insights into the MFE of the
traffic routing game: Suppose that all the players except the
player n adopt the policy Q∗ (the optimal solution to (9)) and
the number of players tends to infinity. Since Q∗ will equalize
3We note that the equalizer property (the term borrowed from [44]) of the
minimizers of free energy functions is well-known in statistical mechanics,
information theory, and robust Bayes estimation theory.
5the costs of all alternative routing policies for player n, any
routing policy will be a best response for her. In particular,
this means that the policy Q∗ itself will also be one of the
best responses, and thus the fixed point condition (7) will be
satisfied. Therefore, Q∗ will be an MFE of the considered
traffic routing game. The following theorem, which is the main
result of this paper, confirms this intuition.
Theorem 2: A symmetric strategy profile Qijn,t = Q
ij∗
t for
each n ∈ N , t ∈ T and i, j ∈ V , where Qij∗t is obtained by
(11)–(13), is an MFE of the traffic routing game.
Proof: Appendix D.
Theorem 2, together with Theorem 1, provides an efficient
algorithm for computing an MFE of the traffic routing game
presented in Section II. In particular, we remark that the MFE
can be computed by the backward-in-time recursion (11)–(13).
This is in stark contrast to the standard MFG formalism in
which a coupled pair of forward and backward equations must
be solved to obtain an MFE.
Finally, we remark that the equalizer property of the
MFE Q∗ characterized by Lemma 2 is a reminiscent of
the Wardrop’s first principle, stating that costs are equal on
all the routes used at the equilibrium. Although the costs
usually mean journey times in the literature around Wardrop’s
principles [25], [26], the cost in our setting is the sum of
the travel costs and the tax costs as stated in (4). In this
sense, Lemma 2 can be viewed as an extension of the standard
description of the Wardrop’s first principle.
VI. WEAK AND STRONG TIME CONSISTENCY
This short section presents another notable property of the
MFE derived in the previous section. Let Qn,t = Qt for each
n ∈ N and 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 be a symmetric strategy profile,
and Pt be the probability distribution over V induced by Qt
as in (8). For every time step 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, a dynamic
game restricted to the time horizon {t, t + 1, ..., T − 1} with
the initial condition Pt is called the subgame of the original
game. The following are natural extensions of the strong and
weak time consistency concepts in the dynamic game theory
[39] to MFGs.
Definition 4: An MFE strategy profile Q∗ is said to be:
1) weakly time-consistent if for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
{Q∗s}t≤s≤T−1 constitutes an MFE of the subgame re-
stricted to {t, t + 1, ..., T − 1} when {Qs}0≤s≤t−1 =
{Q∗s}0≤s≤t−1.
2) strongly time-consistent of for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
{Q∗s}t≤s≤T−1 constitutes an MFE of the subgame re-
stricted to {t, t+1, ..., T−1} when regardless of the policy
{Qs}0≤s≤t−1 implemented in the past.
In the standard MFG formalism [2], [3] where the MFE is
characterized by a forward-backward HJB-FPK system, the
equilibrium policy is only weakly time-consistent in general.
This is because, in the event of Pt not being consistent with
the distribution induced by {Q∗s}0≤s≤t−1, the MFE of the
subgame must be recalculated by solving the HJB-FPK system
over t ≤ s ≤ T − 1. In contrast, the MFE considered
in this paper is characterized only by a backward equation
(Theorems 1 and 2). A notable consequence of this fact is that
…
𝑗𝑗 = 1
𝑗𝑗 = 2
𝑗𝑗 = 𝐽𝐽
Origin Destination
Path 1
Path 2
Path 𝐽𝐽
… …
Origin Destination
Path 1
Path 2
Path 𝐽𝐽
…
Fig. 1. Simple path choice problem.
even if the initial condition Pt is inconsistent with the planned
distribution, it does not alter the fact that {Q∗s}t≤s≤T−1
constitutes an MFE of the subgame restricted to t ≤ s ≤ T−1.
Therefore, the MFE characterized by Theorems 1 and 2 is
strongly time-consistent.
VII. MEAN FIELD EQUILIBRIUM AND FICTITIOUS PLAY
The equalizer property of the MFE characterized by
Lemma 2 raises the following question regarding the stability
of the equilibrium: If the MFE equalizes the costs of all the
available route selection policies, what incentivizes individual
players to stay at the MFE policy Q∗? In this section, we
reason about the stability of MFE by relating it with the
convergence of the fictitious play process [40] for an associated
repetitive game. Convergence of fictitious play processes have
been studied in depth in [40] and [45]. We also remark that
fictitious play for day-to-day policy adjustments for traffic
routing has been considered in [46], [47]. Fictitious play in
the context of MFGs has been studied in the recent work [48].
Consider the situation in which the traffic routing game is
repeated on a daily basis, and individual players update their
routing policies based on their past experiences. For simplicity,
we only consider a single-origin-single-destination, N -player
traffic routing game shown in Figure 1. We assume that there
are J parallel routes from the origin to the destination. All
players are initially located at the origin node. Each route j is
associated with the travel cost cj and the tax cost α log K
j
N
NRj ,
where KjN is the number of players selecting route j. As
before, α,Cj , Rj are given constants. By fictitious play, we
mean the following day-to-day policy adjustment mechanism
for individual players: On day one, each player n ∈ N
makes initial guesses on player m’s mixed strategies (for all
m 6= n) for their route selection. Player n’s belief on player
m’s policy is demoted by Qn→m[1] ∈ ∆J−1. Assuming that
Qn→m[1],∀m 6= n are fixed, player n selects a route with the
lowest expected cost. Player n’s route selection is observed
and recorded by all players at the end of day one. On day `,
player n’s belief Qn→m[`] ∈ ∆J−1 for each m 6= n is set
to be equal to the vector of observed empirical frequencies
of player m’s route choices up to day ` − 1. The process is
repeated on a daily basis. We call Qn→m[`], ` = 1, 2, · · · for
all pairs m 6= n the belief paths. The process is summarized
in Algorithm 1.
In what follows, we show that Algorithm 1 converges
to a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the N -player
game shown in Figure 1 if the initial belief is symmetric.
A numerical simulation is presented in Section VIII-B to
6Algorithm 1: The fictitious play process for the simplified
traffic routing game.
Step 0: On day one, each player n initializes a mixed
strategy in belief Qn→m[1] ∈ ∆J−1 for each m 6= n
according to which she believes player m select routes.
Step 1: At the beginning of day `, each player n fixes
assumed mixed strategy Qn→m[`] ∈ ∆J−1 according to
which she believes player m select routes. Based on this
assumption, she selects her best response
rn[`] = arg minj y
j
n[`], where y
j
n[`] is the assumed cost
of selecting route j, i.e.,
yjn[`] = E
(
Cj + α log
KjN
NRj
)
. (18)
Step 2: At the end of day k, each player n updates her
belief based on observations rm[`],m 6= n by
Qn→m[`+ 1] =
`
`+ 1
Qn→m[`] +
1
`+ 1
δ(rm[`]) (19)
where δ(r) is the indicator vector whose r-th entry is one and
all other entries are zero. Return to Step 1.
demonstrate this convergence behavior, where we also observe
that the policy obtained in the limit of the belief path is
closely approximated by the MFE if N is sufficiently large.
This observation provides the MFE with an interpretation as a
steady-state value of the players’ day-to-day belief adjustment
processes in a large population traffic routing game.
Convergence of Algorithm 1 is a straightforward conse-
quence of Monderer and Shapley [40], where it is shown that
every belief path for N -player games with identical payoff
functions converges to an equilibrium. This result is directly
applicable to the N -player traffic routing game shown in
Figure 1 since it is clearly a symmetric game. The only caveat
is that there is no guarantee that the belief path converges to a
symmetric equilibrium if the game has multiple Nash equilib-
ria (including non-symmetric ones). However, this difficulty
can be circumvented if we impose an additional assumption
that the initial belief is symmetric, i.e., Qn→m[1] = Q[1]
for some Q[1] ∈ ∆J−1 for all (m,n) pairs. If the initial
belief is symmetric, the belief path generated by Algorithm 1
remains symmetric, i.e., Qn→m[`] = Q[`], yn[`] = y[`] and
rn[`] = r[`] for ` ≥ 1. In this case, equations (18) and (19)
are simplified to
yi[`] = Cj + α
N−1∑
k=0
log
(
k + 1
NRj
)(
N−1
k
)
× (Qj [`])k(1−Qj [`])N−1−k
and
Q[`+ 1] =
`
`+ 1
Q[`] +
1
`+ 1
δ(r[`])
respectively. Combined with the convergence result by Mon-
derer and Shapley [40], it can be concluded that every limit
point of the belief path generated by Algorithm 1 with
symmetric initial belief is a symmetric equilibrium.
The next lemma shows that there exists a unique symmetric
equilibrium in the simple traffic routing game in Figure 1 with
finite number of players.
Lemma 3: There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium,
denoted by Q(N)∗, in the N -player traffic routing game shown
in Figure 1.
Proof: Appendix E.
Now, consider the limit limN→∞Q(N)∗ and its relationship
with the MFE Q∗. Notice that the MFE of the traffic routing
game in Figure 1 is characterized as the unique solution to the
following convex optimization problem:
min
Q∈∆J−1
J∑
j=1
Qj
(
Cj + α log
Qj
Rj
)
. (20)
In Section VIII-B, we perform a simulation study where we
observe that Q∗ is a good approximation of Q(N)∗ when N
is sufficiently large. Although the condition under which the
identity limN→∞Q(N)∗ = Q∗ holds must be studied carefully
in the future,4 this observation suggests an important practical
interpretation of the MFE: namely, it is an approximation of
the limit point of the belief path (or equivalently, the empirical
frequency of each player to take particular routes) of the
symmetric fictitious play when N is large. This provides an
answer to the question regarding the stability of the MFE
raised in the beginning of this section.
VIII. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION
In this section, we present numerical simulations that illus-
trate the main results obtained in Sections V and VII.
A. Traffic routing game and congestion control
We first illustrate the result of Theorem 2 applied to a traffic
routing game shown in Fig. 2. At t = 0, the population is
concentrated in the origin cell (indicated by “O”). For t ∈ T ,
the travel cost for each player is
Cijt =

Cterm if j = i
1 + Cterm if j ∈ V(i)
100000 + Cterm if j 6∈ V(i) or j is an obstacle
where V(i) contains the north, east, south, and west neigh-
borhood of the cell i. To incorporate the terminal cost, we
introduce Cterm = 0 if t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1 and Cterm =
10
√
dist(j,D) if t = T −1, where dist(j,D) is the Manhattan
distance between the player’s final location j and the destina-
tion cell (indicated by “D”). As the reference distribution, we
use Rijt = 1/|V(i)| (uniform distribution) for each i ∈ V and
t ∈ T to incentivize players to spread over the traffic graph.
For various values of α > 0, the backward formula (11) is
solved and the optimal policy is calculated by (13). If α is
small (e.g., α = 0.1), it is expected that players will take the
4While Lemma 3 establishes the uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium
for a simple traffic routing game shown in Figure 1, its extension to the general
class of traffic routing game formulated in Section II is currently unknown.
The proof of the identity limN→∞Q(N)∗ = Q∗ (for both the simple game
in Figure 1 and the general setup in Section II) must be postponed as future
work.
7Fig. 2. Mean-field traffic routing game with T = 70 over a traffic graph with
100 nodes (grid world with obstacles). Plots show vehicle distribution Pt at
t = 20, 35, 50 and for α = 0.1 and 1.
shortest path since the action cost is dominant compared to
the tax cost (2). This is confirmed by numerical simulation;
three figures in the top row of Fig. 2 show snapshots of the
population distribution at time steps t = 20, 35 and 50. In
the bottom row, similar plots are generated with a larger α
(α = 1). In this case, it can be seen that the equilibrium
strategy will choose longer paths with higher probability to
reduce congestion.
B. Symmetric fictitious play
Next, we present a numerical demonstration of the symmet-
ric fictitious play studied in Section VII. Consider a simple
traffic graph in Figure 1 with three alternative paths (J = 3).
We set travel costs (C1, C2, C3) = (2, 1, 3), while fixing
R1 = R2 = R3 = 1/3 and α = 1. Figure 3 shows the
belief path generated by the policy update rule (19) with the
initial policy Q[1] = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). The left shows the case
with 20 players (N = 20), while the right plot shows the case
with N = 200. The MFE
Q∗ =
1∑
j R
j exp(−cj)
R1 exp(−c1)R2 exp(−c2)
R3 exp(−c3)
 =
0.2450.665
0.090

is also shown in each plot. The plot for N = 20 shows that,
while the belief path is convergent, there is a certain offset
between its limit point and the MFE. This is because the
number of players is not sufficiently large. On the other hand,
when N = 200, the MFE Q∗ is a good approximate to the
limit point of the belief path.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we showed that the MFE of a large-population
traffic routing game under the log-population tax mechanism
can be obtained via the linearly solvable MDP. Strong time
consistency of the derived MFE was discussed. A connection
between the MFE and fictitious play was investigated.
While this paper is restricted discrete-time discrete-state
formalisms, its continuous-time continuous-state counterpart
is worth investigating in the future. The interface between the
existing traffic SUE theory [24] and MFG must be thoroughly
studied in the future work. Convergence of fictitious play and
its relationship with MFE presented in Section VII should be
studied in more general settings. Linear solvability renders the
proposed MFG framework attractive as an incentive mecha-
nism for TSOs for the purpose of traffic congestion mitigation;
however, questions from the perspectives of mechanism design
theory, such as how to tune parameters α and R (which
are assumed given in this paper) to balance the efficiency
and budget, are unexplored. Finally, generalization to non-
homogeneous MFGs with multiple classes of players (which
was recently studied in [49]) needs further investigation.
APPENDIX A
EXPLICIT EXPRESSION OF (3)
Since player n’s probability of taking action j at location i
at time step t is given by P in,tQ
ij
n,t, the total number K
ij
N,t of
such players follows the Poisson binomial distribution
Pr(KijN,t = k) =
∑
A∈Fk
∏
n∈A
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
∏
nc∈Ac
(1− P inc,tQijnc,t).
Here, Fk is the set of all subsets of size k that can be selected
from N = {1, 2, ..., N}, and Ac = Fk\A. Similarly, the
distribution of KiN,t is given by
Pr(KiN,t = k) =
∑
A∈Fk
∏
n∈A
P in,t
∏
nc∈Ac
(1− P inc,t).
Notice also that the conditional distribution of KijN,t given
player n’s location-action pair (in,t, jn,t) = (i, j) is
Pr(KijN,t = k + 1 | in,t = i, jn,t = j)
=
∑
A∈F−nk
∏
m∈A
P im,tQ
ij
m,t
∏
mc∈A−c
(1− P imc,tQijmc,t). (21)
Here, F−nk is the set of all subsets of size k that can be selected
from N\{n}, and A−c = F−nk \A. Similarly, the conditional
distribution of KiN,t given in,t = i is
Pr(KiN,t = k + 1 | in,t = i)
=
∑
A∈F−nk
∏
m∈A
P im,t
∏
mc∈A−c
(1− P imc,t). (22)
Therefore, given the prior knowledge that the player n’s
location-action pair at time t is (i, j), the expectation of her
tax penalty piijN,n,t is
ΠijN,n,t , E
[
piijN,n,t | in,t = i, jn,t = j
]
=
N−1∑
k=0
α log
k + 1
N
∑
A∈F−nk
∏
m∈A
P im,tQ
ij
m,t
∏
mc∈Ac
(1−P imc,tQijmc,t)
−
N−1∑
k=0
α log
k + 1
N
∑
A∈F−nk
∏
m∈A
P im,t
∏
mc∈Ac
(1−P imc,t)
− α logRijt . (23)
Notice that the quantity (23) depends on the strategies Q−n ,
{Qm}m 6=n, but not on Qn. In other words, piijN,n,t is a random
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Fig. 3. Convergence of the belief path generated by the symmetric fictitious play (19) in the N -player single-stage traffic routing game with three (J = 3)
alternative paths shown in Figure 1. The left plot shows the case with N = 20 while the right plot show the case with N = 200. The value of MFE Q∗ is
also shown.
variable whose distribution does not depend on player n’s own
strategy.
To evaluate ΠijN,n,t when all players other than player n
takes the same strategy (i.e., Qm,t = Q∗t for m 6= n), notice
that the conditional distributions of KijN,t and K
i
N,t given
(in,t, jn,t) = (i, j), provided by (21) and (22), simplify to
the binomial distributions
Pr(KijN,t = k + 1|in,t = i, jn,t = j)
=
(
N−1
k
)
(P i∗t Q
ij∗
t )
k(1− P i∗t Qij∗t )N−1−k
Pr(KiN,t = k + 1|in,t = i)
=
(
N−1
k
)
(P i∗t )
k(1− P i∗t )N−1−k.
Thus, the expression (23) simplifies to
ΠijN,n,t = E
[
piijN,n,t | in = i, jn = j
]
=
N−1∑
k=0
α log
k + 1
N
(
N−1
k
)
(P i∗t Q
ij∗
t )
k(1−P i∗t Qij∗t )N−1−k
−
N−1∑
k=0
α log
k + 1
N
(
N−1
k
)
(P i∗t )
k(1−P i∗t )N−1−k
− α logRijt (24)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let KiN,−n,t denote the number of agents, except agent n,
which are located at intersection i at time t and let KijN,−n,t
denote the number of agents, except agent n, which are located
at intersection i at time t and select intersection j as their
next destination. Thus, we have KiN,−n,t =
∑
l 6=n 1{il,t = i}
and KijN,−n,t =
∑
l 6=n 1{il,t = i, jl,t = j}, where 1{·} is the
indicator function. Then, Πij∗N,n,t can be written as
Πij∗N,n,t =E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
1+KiN,−n,t
]
− logRijt
=E
[
log
(
1+KijN,−n,t
N
)]
−
E
[
log
(
1+KiN,−n,t
N
)]
− logRijt
Using Jensen inequality, we have
E
[
log
(
1+KijN,−n,t
N
)]
≤ log
(
1
N
+ E
[
KijN,−n,t
N
])
(a)
= log
(
1
N
+
N − 1
N
P i∗t Q
ij∗
t
)
where (a) follows from E
[
KijN,−n,t
N
]
= N−1N P
i∗
t Q
ij∗
t and the
fact that all the agents employ the policy {Q∗t }. Thus, we have
lim sup
N→∞
E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N
]
≤ logP i∗t Qij∗t (25)
Next we show the other direction. For  ∈ (0, P i∗t Qij∗t2
]
, we
can write E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N
]
as
E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N
]
=E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N 1
{
KijN,−n,t
N > 
}]
+
E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N 1
{
KijN,−n,t
N ≤ 
}]
Using the Hoeffding inequality, it follows that
KijN,−n,t
N
converges to P i∗t Q
ij∗
t in probability as N becomes large.
From continues mapping theorem, we have the conver-
gence of log
KijN,−n,t
N in probability to logP
i∗
t Q
ij∗
t for
9P i∗t Q
ij∗
t > 0. Similarly, 1
{
KijN,−n,t
N > 
}
converges
to 1 in probability. Thus, from Slutsky’s Theorem, we
have log
1+KijN,−n,t
N 1
{
KijN,−n,t
N > 
}
converges to logP i∗t Q
ij∗
t
in distribution. Using Fatou’s lemma and the fact that
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N 1
{
KijN,−n,t
N > 
}
≥ log  , we have
lim inf
N→∞
E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N 1
{
KijN,−n,t
N > 
}]
≥ logP i∗t Qij∗t
We also have∣∣∣∣E [log 1+KijN,−n,tN 1{KijN,−n,tN ≤ }]∣∣∣∣
≤ log (N)Pr
(
KijN,−n,t
N ≤ 
)
Using the Hoeffding inequality, it is straightforward to show
that Pr
(
KijN,−n,t
N ≤ 
)
decays to zero exponentially in N
which implies that
lim
N→∞
E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N 1
{
KijN,−n,t
N ≤ 
}]
= 0
Thus, we have
lim inf
N→∞
E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N
]
≥ logP i∗t Qij∗t (26)
which implies that limN→∞ E
[
log
(
1+KijN,−n,t
N
)]
=
logP i∗t Q
ij∗
t . Following similar steps, it is straightforward to
show that limN→∞ E
[
log
(
1+KiN,−n,t
N
)]
= logP i∗t which
completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Due to the choice of the terminal condition φiT = 1,
VT (PT ) =
∑
i
P iTC
i
T = −α
∑
i
P iT log φ
i
T = 0
holds. To complete the proof by backward induction, assume
that Vt+1(Pt+1) = −α
∑
i P
i
t+1 log φ
i
t+1 holds for some 0 ≤
t ≤ T − 1. Then, due to the Bellman equation (10), we have
Vt(Pt) = min
Qt
∑
i,j
P itQ
ij
t
(
ρijt + α log
Qijt
Rijt
) (27)
where ρijt = C
ij
t − α log φjt+1 is a constant. To obtain a min-
imizer for (27) subject to the constraints P it
(∑
j Q
ij
t − 1
)
=
0 ∀i, introduce the Lagrangian function
L(Qt, λt) =
∑
i,j
P itQ
ij
t
(
ρijt + α log
Qijt
Rijt
)
−
∑
i
λitP
i
t
∑
j
Qijt − 1
 .
For each i such that P it > 0, we obtain from the optimality
condition ∂L
∂Qijt
= 0 that
Qijt = R
ij
t exp
(
λit
α
− 1− ρ
ij
t
α
)
.
In order to satisfy
∑
j Q
ij
t = 1, the Lagrange multiplier λ
i
t
must be chosen so that
Qijt =
Rijt
Zit
exp
(
−ρ
ij
t
α
)
where the normalization constant Zit can be computed as
Zit =
∑
j
Rijt exp
(
−ρ
ij
t
α
)
=
∑
j
Rijt exp
(
−C
ij
t
α
)
φjt+1
= φit.
Therefore, we have shown that a minimizer for (27) is obtained
as
Qij∗t =
Rijt
φit
exp
(
−ρ
ij
t
α
)
from which (13) also follows. By substitution, the optimal
value is shown to be Vt(Pt) = −α
∑
i P
i
t log φ
i
t. This com-
pletes the induction proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Let the policies Qijm,t = Q
ij∗
t for m 6= n be fixed. It is
sufficient to show that there exists a sequence N ↘ 0 such
that the cost of adopting a strategy Qijn,t = Q
ij∗
t for player
n is no greater than N plus the cost of adopting any other
policy. Since
ΠijN,n,t → α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
as N →∞,
there exists a sequence δN ↘ 0 such that
ΠijN,n,t + δN > α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
∀i, j, t.
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Now, for all policy {Qn,t}t∈T of player n and the induced
distributions P jn,t =
∑
i P
i
n,tQ
ij
n,t, we have
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
(
Cijt + Π
ij
N,n,t
)
>
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
(
Cijt + α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
− δN
)
=
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
(
Cijt + α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
)
− TV 2δN
≥ min
{Qn,t}t∈T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
(
Cijt + α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
)
− TV 2δN .
Notice that the minimization in the last line is attained by
adopting Qijn,t = Q
ij∗
t . Since N , TV 2δN ↘ 0, this
completes the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
For each j = 1, 2, ..., J , define f jN : [0, 1]→ R by
f jN (Q
j) ,
cj + α
N−1∑
n=0
log
n+ 1
NRj
(
N−1
n
)
(Qj)n(1−Qj)N−1−n.
Notice that f jN (Q) is a continuous and strictly increasing
function. If Q∗ ∈ ∆J−1 is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of
the N -player single-stage traffic routing game, it satisfies the
condition
Q∗ ∈ arg min
Q∈∆J−1
J∑
j=1
Qjf jN (Q
j∗). (28)
From the KKT condition, Q∗ ∈ ∆J−1 satisfies (28) if and
only if there exists λ ∈ R such that
f jN (Q
j∗) = λ for all j such that Qj∗ > 0 (29a)
f jN (0) ≥ λ for all j such that Qj∗ = 0. (29b)
Alternatively, the above condition can directly be obtained
from the Wardrop’s first principle [25]. Thus, it is sufficient
to show that there exists a unique Q∗ ∈ ∆J−1 satisfying the
condition (29). For each j = 1, 2, ..., N , define gj : R→ [0, 1]
by
gj(λ) =

0 if λ ≤ f j(0)
(f j)−1(λ) if f j(0) < λ ≤ f j(1)
1 if f j(1) < 1.
(30)
The next claim follows from the intermediate value theorem
and the monotonicity of gj for each j.
Claim 1: There exists λ ∈ R such that g(λ) = 1. Moreover,
if there exist λ1, λ2 ∈ R such that g(λ1) = g(λ2), then
gj(λ1) = g
j(λ2) for each j.
Claim 2: If Q∗ ∈ ∆J−1 and λ ∈ R satisfy (29), then it is
necessary that g(λ) = 1.
Proof: Assume (29) and g(λ) 6= 1. Then∑
j
Qj∗ =
∑
j:Qj∗>0
Qj∗ (31a)
=
∑
j:Qj∗>0
gj(λ) (31b)
=
∑
j:Qj∗>0
gj(λ) +
∑
j:Qj∗=0
gj(λ) (31c)
=
∑
j
gj(λ) (31d)
= g(λ) 6= 1. (31e)
Equality (31b) follows from (29a) and (30). Equality (31c)
holds since, for j such that Qj∗ = 0, we have f jN (0) ≥ λ by
(29b) and thus, by definition (30), gj(λ) = 0. However, the
chain of equalities (31) is a contradiction to Q∗ ∈ ∆J−1.
Now, pick any λ ∈ R such that g(λ) = 1, and construct Q∗
by Qj∗ = gj(λ). By Claim 1, such a Q∗ is unique. It is easy to
check that Q∗ ∈ ∆J−1 and the condition (29) is satisfied. This
construction, together with Claim 2, shows that there exists a
unique Q∗ ∈ ∆J−1 satisfying the condition (29).
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